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BOOK REVIEW
THE PERILS OF WISHFUL THINKING
ABOUT ABORTION
Jonathan L. Entint
THE POLITICS OF ABORTION
by Anne Hendershott
(New York: Encounter Books, 2006) iv + 179 pp.
Abortion has been one of our most divisive issues for some time
now.' University of San Diego sociologist Anne Hendershott seeks to
"assess the progress in the culture wars surrounding abortion, 2 but
The Politics of Abortion exemplifies the difficulty of "recover[ing] the
language of public argument" on this subject . Most of the book reads
more like an advocacy document than a rigorous social scientific
analysis. Professor Hendershott might be correct that "momentum in
the political debate has swung almost imperceptibly to the pro-life
side, ' 4 but the evidence she adduces for this conclusion is sketchy and
anecdotal at best. The problem is not that the author has a point of
view, but rather that she allows her point of view to obscure her vision
of the ambiguities and uncertainties that still surround the abortion
debate.
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law and Political
Science, Case Western Reserve University. E-mail: jle@case.edu.
1 A detailed analysis of data from the General Social Survey and the Na-
tional Election Study found that abortion was the only specific issue among several
dozen that showed increasing polarization between the early 1970s and the mid-
1990s. Paul DiMaggio et al., Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become More Polar-
ized?, 102 Am. J. Soc. 690, 715-16, 729-30, 733-39 (1996). For further discussion of
the General Social Survey and the National Election Study, see infra Part I.
2 ANNE HENDERSHOTr, THE POLMCS OF ABORTION 6 (2006).
3 Id. at 147.
4 Id. at 138.
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I.
Let's begin with the notion that most Americans are pro-life. In
support of this claim, Professor Hendershott relies on a press release
posted on the Zogby International web site that in turn refers to an
October 2003 Washington Post-ABC News poll which found that 58
percent of respondents "thought abortion when the mother's life is not
in danger [was] morally unacceptable."5 The same press release, titled
"New National Abortion Poll Shows Majority of Americans are Pro-
Life," reported Zogby's own finding that 53 percent of respondents
surveyed in December 2003 agreed with the statement that "[a]bortion
destroys a human life and is manslaughter.",
6
There are several problems with inferring from these figures that
most Americans oppose abortion. To begin with, a January 2006
Zogby poll, also discussed on its web site but not mentioned by Pro-
fessor Hendershott, 7 found that 52 percent of respondents nationwide
"favor abortion."8 The 2006 press release provides neither the precise
wording of the question nor specific baseline data supporting the
headline that the new figure was "down markedly from the 1990s."
9
Entirely apart from the more recent Zogby poll, the earlier one
cannot support the weight that Professor Hendershott would have it
bear. First, the abortion debate has focused much more on the exis-
tence of a legal right to terminate a pregnancy than on the ethics of
doing so. Many Americans are profoundly ambivalent about the mo-
rality of abortion but do not necessarily support outlawing the prac-
tice. 10 Even if most people believe that abortion involves the destruc-
5 Id. at 30 (quoting Press Release, Zogby International, New National Abor-
tion Poll Shows Majority of Americans are Pro-Life (Jan. 16, 2004), www.zogby
.com/soundbites/readclips.dbm?ID=6982). The Zogby International release provides
no further details about that poll.
6 Press Release, Zogby International, New National Abortion Poll Shows
Majority of Americans are Pro-Life (Jan. 16, 2004), www.zogby.com/soundbites/read
clips.dbm?ID-6982. Professor Hendershott does not cite the 53 percent figure but
rather emphasizes that 43 percent of Democratic respondents agreed with the state-
ment to support her claim that Democratic voters are becoming increasingly hostile to
abortion and that the Democratic Party's pro-choice position, therefore, is out of the
political mainstream. HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at 29-30.
7 She does cite some roughly contemporaneous sources as well as several
more recent ones, the latest dated May 10, 2006. See HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at
157 nn.32-38, 160 n.30, 161 nn.31-33, 161-62 nn.18-19, 162 n.9, 164 nn.26-28.
8 Press Release, Zogby International, Support for Abortion in Sharp Decline
(Jan. 23, 2006), www.zobgy.com/search/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1060.
9 The release does, however, give the sample size and margin of error. See
id. 1o See, e.g., Jacqueline Scott, Conflicting Beliefs About Abortion: Legal
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tion of a human life, it does not follow that they favor a pro-life public
policy that would make it difficult or impossible for women to obtain
abortions in at least some circumstances. The 2003 Washington Post-
ABC News poll mentioned in the Zogby press release focused on the
moral acceptability of abortion, not on the legality of the practice."
Second, opinions about abortion are very sensitive to question
wording and context. Variations in the way a question is asked can
lead to noticeably different results. For example, specifying particular
circumstances in which a woman might seek an abortion results in
less polarized responses than asking general questions that suggest an
all-or-none response. 12 Similarly, limiting the question to the first tri-
mester might elicit greater approval of abortion in at least some cir-
cumstances than leaving the duration of pregnancy undefined. 1
3
Moreover, the order in which questions are asked can also affect sur-
vey results. For instance, asking a specific question about abortion
before a more general one generates higher levels of disapproval than
asking the general question before the specific one. 14 We know very
little about the Zogby poll emphasized by Professor Hendershott. It
seems to have used a general agree-or-disagree question that probably
impelled some respondents to a more extreme position than they actu-
ally held. The press release on which she relies noted that the poll
asked other abortion-related questions but provided no information
about the precise wording or order of those questions, so we have no
way of assessing how those factors might have affected the results. 1
5
Approval and Moral Doubts, 52 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 319 (1989).
11 The 2003 Zogby poll discussed in the same release is more ambiguous on
this point in that the question referred to abortion as constituting manslaughter. See
Zogby International, supra note 6. As we shall see in the immediately following text,
however, there are other reasons to question whether the responses to that question
show that most Americans have embraced a pro-life position on abortion.
12 See Elizabeth Adell Cook et al., Measuring Public Attitudes on Abortion:
Methodological and Substantive Considerations, 25 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 118, 119-21
(1993). The authors of this study and of the others cited infra notes 13-14 held full-
time academic appointments and were not affiliated with any abortion-related organi-
zation. Cf Teresa Stanton Collett, Transporting Minors for Immoral Purposes: The
Case for the Child Custody Protection Act & the Child Interstate Abortion Notifica-
tion Act, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 107, 127 & n.89 (2006) (discounting studies suggesting
adverse consequences from parental-notification requirements for pregnant adoles-
cents seeking abortions because those studies were "conducted by reproductive rights
activists").
13 See Larry L. Bumpass, The Measurement of Public Opinion on Abortion:
The Effects of Survey Design, 29 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 177, 178-79 (1997).
14 See Howard Schuman et al., Context Effects on Survey Responses to Ques-
tions About Abortion, 45 PUB. Op. Q. 216 (1981); Bumpass, supra note 13, at 179-80.
15 Later in the book, Professor Hendershott also cites a 2005 Harris Poll
finding that substantial majorities of Americans believe that abortion should be illegal
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Third, the Zogby press release provides no direct support for the
view that public opinion about abortion is moving toward a pro-life
majority. This is not surprising because the release addressed a 2003
poll without providing baseline information that would allow us to
draw inferences about trends. We do, in fact. have some information
on that subject, and it comes from the most respected academic pro-
grams in the field of public opinion research. The American National
Election Study (ANES), conducted by the Center for Political Studies
at the University of Michigan, ind the General Social Survey (GSS),
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University
of Chicago, have been surveying representative national samples for
more than three decades. Among the topics covered is abortion. Al-
though both surveys have found that opinions about abortion have
fluctuated somewhat during this time, the range of variation has been
relatively narrow. In the following paragraphs, I present data from the
most recent twenty-year period, beginning in 1984 and running
through 2004.16
The ANES has asked the following question since 1980:
Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your
view?
1. By law, abortion should never be permitted.
2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,
incest, or when the woman's life is in danger.
3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than
rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only
after the need for the abortion has been clearly estab-
lished.
in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy, although most respondents apparently
thought that first-trimester abortions were acceptable. HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at
140. She does not provide the exact wording of the questions, so it is difficult to com-
pare these findings with those of the Zogby survey described in the press release that
she emphasizes or with the long-term studies that are discussed in the immediately
following paragraphs of the text. In any event, the Harris result does not offer baseline
data that could be used to assess changes in public opinion. Earlier studies also found
lower approval levels for abortion at later stages of pregnancy. See Bumpass, supra
note 13, at 178-79.
16 The information on which the following discussion and tables are based
can be found at the websites of the ANES (http://www.electionstudies.org/) and the
GSS (www.norc.uchicago.edu/projects/gensoc.asp) as well as at the Survey Data
Archive at the University of California, Berkeley (http://sda.berkeley.edu/archive
.htm) and the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research at the
University of Michigan (www.icpsr.umich.edu/access/series.html).
[Vol. 17: 101
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4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an
abortion as a matter of personal choice.'
7
Table 1 presents the responses to this question since 1984.
Throughout this period, typically between 12 and 14 percent of re-
spondents have said that abortion should never be allowed (except for
1992, when the figure was 10 percent), and between 28 and 33 percent
have said that abortion should be permitted only in cases of rape, in-
cest, or danger to the woman's life. These two responses capture the
pro-life position. During the second half of this period, the totals have
ranged between 42 and 46 percent; in the first decade the figure was
between 41 and 45 percent (again with the exception of 1992, when it
was 38 percent). On the other hand, between 35 and 40 percent of
respondents have agreed that abortion should always be a matter of
personal choice (except for a high of 46 percent in 1992). Between 14
and 19 percent have taken the intermediate position that the need for
an abortion should be clearly established.
17 NAT'L ELECTION STUDIES, 1980 PRE/POST ELECTION STUDY 36 (produced
and distributed by CTR. FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, SURVEY RESEARCH CTR., INST. FOR
Soc. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF MICHIGAN) (1999), available at ftp://ftp.electionstudies.org/
ftp/nes/studypages/1980prepost/1980prepost-qnaire-pre.pdf. In addition, between
1972 and 1980, the options were:
1. Abortion should never be permitted.
2. Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health of the woman is
in danger.
3. Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman
would have difficulty in caring for the child.
4. Abortion should never be forbidden, since one should not require a
woman to have a child she doesn't want.
Both versions of the abortion question were asked in 1980. See, e.g., NAT'L ELECTION
STUDIES, 1972 PRE/POST ELECTION STUDY 34 (produced and distributed by CTR. FOR
POLITICAL STUDIES, SURVEY RESEARCH CTR., INST. FOR Soc. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF
MICHIGAN) (1999), available at ftp://ftp.electionstudies.org/ftp/nes/studypages/1972
prepost/l 972prepost-qnairepre.pdf.
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Table 1. American National Election Study Abortion Approval (Percent)
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2004
Never 13 13 12 12 10 13 13 12 12 14
Rape,
Incest, 29 28 33 33 28 31 30 30 31 32
Danger
Clear 19 18 18 14 14 14 16 16 15 18
Need
Personal 35 38 35 40 46 40 40 40 39 36
Choice
Don'tKn'w 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1Know
These figures do show that the pro-life position enjoyed more
support in the most recent survey than it did in any of the previous
ones. On the other hand, the change between 2000 and 2004 was only
three percentage points and still leaves the pro-life position below
majority support. An absolute majority of 54 percent rejected the pro-
life position in 2004, although one-third of those respondents also
rejected the strong pro-choice view. It is, of course, entirely possible
that the three-point increase represents the leading edge of a trend
toward a pro-life majority, but it is too soon to draw firm conclusions.
There was a four-point move toward the pro-life position between
1986 and 1988, but that was followed by a seven-point decline be-
tween 1990 and 1992.
The GSS approaches abortion in a somewhat different way, but its
results follow a similar pattern. Since 1972, the GSS has asked the
following questions:
Please tell me whether you think it should be possible for a
woman to obtain a legal abortion:
a. If there is a strong chance of a defect in the baby?
b. If she is married and does not want any more chil-
dren?
c. If the woman's own health is seriously endangered by
the pregnancy?
d. If the family has a very low income and cannot afford
any more children?
[Vol. 17:101
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e. If she became pregnant as a result of rape?
f. If she is not married and does not want to marry the
man?
g. If the woman wants it for any reason?
8
Table 2 presents the responses to these questions since 1984. I
have reordered the responses to put the more restrictive reasons for
approval at the top and the more permissive reasons at the bottom to
facilitate comparison with Table 1. The GSS has found substantial
approval for abortion in cases where a pregnancy would seriously
endanger a woman's health or resulted from rape as well as in situa-
tions in which there is a high likelihood of a serious birth defect. At
least the first two of these situations can be seen as tapping the pro-
life orientation. Like the ANES results, these figures suggest that a
committed minority of Americans has opposed abortion in virtually
all circumstances. Moreover, a majority of respondents has consis-
tently disapproved of abortion for the more permissive reasons that
the woman cannot afford an additional child, is unmarried, does not
desire an additional child, or wants to terminate her pregnancy for any
reason at all (the strongest pro-choice position), but a significant mi-
nority (typically above 40 percent and often above 45 percent) has
supported abortion in those circumstances.
Table 2. General Social Survey Abortion Approval (Percent)
1984 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Danger 89.5 89.3 87.9 88.7 90.1 91.9 91.5 89.8 90.6 91.6 87.9 88.5 91.6 86.0
Rape 80.4 81.2 79.6 81.1 83.2 84.8 86.5 82.9 83.6 84.3 80.1 80.6 79.7 76.2
Defect 80.2 78.5 78.0 78.8 81.3 81.2 83.5 81.3 82.3 81.8 78.6 78.7 78.5 72.9
Can't
Afford 46.3 43.7 44.7 42.0 47.7 48.1 48.5 49.9 50.4 46.6 44.3 42.2 44.4 41.0
Not 44.2 41,2 40.1 39.4 45.4 45.3 44.8 48.1 47.6 44.9 42.3 39.1 42.0 40.9Married
Wants No 42.7 40.3 41.0 39.9 44.5 45.1 44.6 47.1 48.3 46.7 42.3 40.7 44.8 41.8
More
Any 38.6 36.9 39.2 36.1 40.3 43.4 42.6 45.3 46.3 45.0 40.9 39.9 43.0 40.6
Reason
18 The GSS began asking the last question (the "for any reason" question) in
1977.
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Whether the GSS data show the existence of a pro-life majority is
probably in the eye of the beholder. Table 2 contains some apparent
anomalies, such as greater support in some years of allowing abortion
for any reason the woman wants one than for some of the specific
reasons.
More important, the data suggest the difficulty of defining the
term "pro-life." Although most respondents have consistently disap-
proved of abortion for the more permissive reasons, almost as many
have regularly approved of abortion when there is a high likelihood of
a serious birth defect, as when the pregnancy threatens the woman's
health or resulted from rape. Although at least some pro-life advocates
have been willing to tolerate exceptions for rape and health, few, if
any, would do so in the case of a birth defect.
Of greater significance, however, these data do not suggest a dra-
matic change in public opinion in recent years. To be sure, approval of
abortion in all cases was lower in 2004 than it was in 2002, and sup-
port for abortion in the more restrictive situations (health, rape, and
birth defect) was lower in 2004 than in any previous year shown in
Table 2.19 Before concluding that this marks a turn in public opinion,
we should remember that the figures have fluctuated throughout the
twenty-year period. Moreover, approval of abortion in three of the
four more permissive situations actually increased in 2004 over the
corresponding figures for 2000, and approval of abortion for "any
reason" was higher in 2000 (the recent low point) than it was in any
year between 1984 and 1988.20 The 2004 figures suggest a mild shift
in the pro-life direction since 2002, but, if we use 2000 as the baseline
instead, a more ambiguous picture emerges: gains in pro-life attitudes
on some questions that are partially offset by modest shifts in the pro-
choice direction on others. In other words, 2004 might have been a
pivot point, but it might simply reflect cyclical variation in attitudes
on a complex subject. Again, it is too soon to draw firm conclusions.
What matters for present purposes is that the meager evidence
Professor Hendershott presents cannot establish that there is now a
pro-life majority or that public opinion has recently turned decisively
in the pro-life direction. Because she is a social scientist, it would be
interesting to get her analysis of these or similar data. For the same
19 In fact, those figures are the lowest for any year since the GSS began
asking the questions in 1972.
20 For that matter, approval of abortion for "any reason" in 2000 and 2004
was higher than for any year between 1977, when the question was first asked, and
1983 (with the exception of 1980).
[Vol, 17:101
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reason, it is disappointing that she relies on such flimsy evidence for
one of her most important claims.
II.
There are other curious aspects to the book. Most significant, Pro-
fessor Hendershott has almost nothing to say about contraception. She
does at one point refer to "the abortifacient morning-after pill ' 21 and
devotes several pages to attacking birth control pioneer Margaret
Sanger as a racist snob "who wanted poor women and children to be
eliminated., 22 That is the extent of discussion of the subject.
It is not clear whether the first reference is to mifepristone (RU-
486), which can work after implantation,23 or levonorgestrel (Plan B),
which works before implantation but has no effect after implantation
has occurred. 24 Virtually everyone agrees that RU-486 is an abortifa-
cient, but making the same claim about Plan B is quite controversial
precisely because actual implantation is part of the standard medical
definition of pregnancy.25 Preventing implantation, therefore, does not
cause an abortion.2 6 Perhaps this scientific imprecision is understand-
able, although Professor Hendershott criticizes a fellow sociologist on
similar grounds.27 After all, her discussion of the morning-after pill
appears in a section about policies at Catholic colleges and universi-
ties. Because Catholic doctrine holds that life begins at fertilization,
anything that prevents implantation involves the taking of a human
life and, therefore, must be treated as impermissibly inducing abor-
21 HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at 111.
22 Id. at 36. See generally id. at 34-37, 39-40. Professor Hendershott does not
say anything about Sanger's views on abortion. She focuses only on Sanger's motiva-
tion for promoting contraception.
23 E.g., Anna Glasier, Emergency Postcoital Contraception, 337 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1058, 1060 (1997); Sophie Christin-Maitre et al., Medical Termination of Preg-
nancy, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 946, 946-47 (2000). In fact, RU-486 can also avert
pregnancy by preventing implantation. Glasier, supra, at 1059.
24 E.g., Glasier, supra note 23, at 1060; David A. Grimes, Switching Emer-
gency Contraception to Over-the-Counter Status, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 846, 847
(2002); Carolyn Westhoff, Emergency Contraception, 349 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1830,
1830-31 (2003).
25 E.g., COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS, OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC TERMINOLOGY 299 ("Conception is the
implantation of the blastocyst. It is not synonymous with fertilization."), 327 ("Preg-
nancy is the state of a female after conception and until termination of the gestation.")
(Edward C. Hughes ed., 1972).
26 Id. at 414; Grimes, supra note 24, at 847.
27 See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
2007]
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tion.28 If that is the explanation, however, Professor Hendershott does
not say so.
As for Sanger, there is no doubt that she sympathized with the
eugenics movement and some of its unsavory views, but the story is
not as simple as Hendershott tries to make it. Professor Dorothy Rob-
erts, whom she quotes disparagingly in a different context,29 has ex-
plained the complex racial implications of the birth control movement.
While some African-Americans regard contraception as a genocidal
imposition by the white power structure, others view the practice as a
way to promote individual and family fulfillment as well as commu-
nity improvement.30 Hendershott seems unaware of such alternative
perspectives. Moreover, she argues that pro-choice forces "target"
women of color by locating most abortion clinics in or near minority
neighborhoods.3' Perhaps so, but she never addresses the possibility
that the higher incidence of abortion among African-Americans might
reflect, at least in part, racial disparities in the incidence of out-of-
wedlock pregnancy. This is a curious omission because in her previ-
ous book Professor Hendershott defended Daniel Patrick Moynihan's
controversial 1965 proposal to combat disproportionately high black
illegitimacy rates and observed that we are now paying the price for
ignoring his prescient warnings about the adverse social consequences
of family instability.32 Perhaps it would not be feasible to investigate
the extent, if any, of the relationship between racial disparities in
pregnancy rates for unmarried women and similar differentials in
abortion rates, or maybe there is no such relationship. One might,
however, expect a sociologist to talk about the question.
The most striking aspect of the dearth of attention to contracep-
tion in a book that claims to be seeking a way to lower the intensity of
the abortion debate is that preventing unintended pregnancies should
reduce the incidence of abortion. Professor Hendershott clearly under-
stands this connection, devoting several pages to the way that federal
welfare reform sought "to lower the incidence of out-of-wedlock
28 This view is not exclusive to Catholic doctrine. Anyone who believes that
life begins at fertilization will regard anything that prevents implantation as an aborti-
facient.
29 HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at 46 (criticizing Roberts for supporting
President Clinton's lifting of the ban on abortion counseling at federally funded health
clinics).
30 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION,
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 56-103 (1997).
31 HENDERSHOTT, supra note 2, at 32, 37.
32 ANNE HENDERSHOTT, THE POLITICS OF DEVIANCE 156-57 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter HENDERSHOTr, DEVIANCE].
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childbearing without increasing the rate of abortion." 33 Even here,
though, she says nothing about birth control.34 Maybe the whole sub-
ject is just too difficult for many pro-life people to contemplate.35
Surely, though, any thorough analysis of abortion politics should at
least mention the issue, if only to explain why contraception looks like
a taboo topic for some important participants in the debate.
There is also an odd tension in Hendershott's treatment of the
abortion debate in higher education. She complains that "many Catho-
lic campuses are Catholic in name only"36 and applauds moves to ban
pro-choice speakers who take positions that contradict church doc-
trine. 37 At the same time, she hails the emergence of pro-life advocacy
at elite secular institutions.38 How we are to move the abortion debate,
as Hendershott urges, "out of the courts and back to the realm of local
policy, where we might once again debate the politics of abortion as
neighbors and friends, 39 is difficult to envision if we cannot conduct
civil discourse about this complex subject in our colleges and univer-
sities. On the author's own premise, we should view as positive de-
velopments both the emergence of pro-life views on campuses that
have been predominantly pro-choice and the appearance of pro-choice
positions on campuses that have been predominantly pro-life. Of
course, religious institutions that oppose abortion cannot and should
not be compelled to endorse a practice they find abhorrent.40 There is,
however, a vast difference between listening to different views and
endorsing objectionable ones. Hendershott seems not to see this dis-
tinction.
Two final gaps are worth noting. One relates to the political
analysis, the other to the legal discussion. Let me take these in order.
On the political side, the book contains extensive criticism of Democ-
ratic leaders for allowing their party to be "hijacked" by pro-choice
33 HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at 50.
34 See id. at 50-54.
35 See William Saletan, Where the Rubber Meets Roe, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
2006, at B2 (explaining that objections by some pro-life forces led to the failure of a
congressional compromise aimed at reducing abortion through various methods,
including increased access to birth control).
HENDERSHOT-r, supra note 2, at 112.
31 Id. at 113-14.
38 Id. at 114-18.
39 Id. at 147.
40 One prominent Catholic institution, Boston College, recently adopted a
policy that includes a provision that could require student organizations to bring in a
supporter of Catholic doctrine if they invite a speaker whose views are inconsistent
with church teaching. Thomas Bartlett, Boston College to Veto Students' Speakers,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 27, 2006, at A40.
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extremists. 41 At the same time, the author has almost nothing to say
about the politics of abortion inside the Republican Party. She alludes
to the existence of pro-choice Republicans, such as Nelson Rockefel-
ler, who signed New York State's 1970 abortion liberalization law,42
and Kathy Taylor, a pro-choice Pennsylvania Republican who spoke
at the 1992 Democratic National Convention where pro-life Governor
Robert Casey was not allowed on the podium. 43 Those references are
one-sentence digressions from the critique of the Democrats. We get
no sense of how representative of Republican opinion Rockefeller and
Taylor might have been. Meanwhile, Professor Hendershott ignores
Ronald Reagan, who signed California's pioneering 1967 abortion
reform bill but later embraced the pro-life view.44 Moreover, she is
completely silent about the importance of opposition to abortion
within the GOP. For example, President-elect George W. Bush's pre-
ferred candidate for attorney general, Governor Marc Racicot of Mon-
tana, withdrew from consideration in December 2000 after influential
conservatives strenuously lobbied against him for being insufficiently
pro-life. 45 Similarly, some previously pro-choice Republican politi-
cians have come out against abortion while considering runs for
higher office.46
41 HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at 18. The author devotes her first chapter to
this subject. See id. at 9-30.
42 Id. at 13.
41 Id. at 19.
44 See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALrrY 331, 634 (1994).
45 See, e.g., Mike Allen, Montana Gov. Didn't Have Right Stuff, GOP Con-
servatives Derailed Racicotfor Attorney General, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2001, at Al;
Gloria Borger, How to Get Bush's Goat, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 2001, at
24; see also Mike Dennison, Reports: Conservatives Opposed Racicot for U.S. Attor-
ney General, GREAT FALLS TRIB., Dec. 22, 2000, at IA.
46 The most prominent pro-choice GOP official to have recently embraced a
pro-life position is Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney. See Pam Belluck, Gover-
nor of a Blue State Tries to Accentuate the Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005,
at Al; Scott S. Greenberger, Romney Hints of a Shift on Abortion: In Interview, Says
He Is 'In a Different Place,' BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 2005, at B 1; What He Said,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 2005, at B5. Ohio Attorney General Jim Petro switched from
pro-choice to pro-life several years ago and took an even stronger position against
abortion during his unsuccessful quest for the 2006 Republican gubernatorial nomina-
tion. His opponent in the primary, Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell, opposed
abortion in all cases; Petro supported an exception for the life of the pregnant woman
but abandoned his earlier willingness to permit abortion in cases of rape or incest.
See, e.g., Joe Hallett, GOP Foes Harden Abortion Positions; Blackwell, Petro Now
Against Procedure in Almost All Cases, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 2006, at IA;
Julie Carr Smyth, Candidate Petro Touts Values in Ads, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Nov.
29, 2005, at B5.
Although Professor Hendershott overlooks such examples on the Republi-
can side, she has quite a lot to say about Democratic politicians who switched from
[Vol. 17: 101
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Finally, Professor Hendershott's legal analysis is noticeably in-
complete. She has much to say about Roe v. Wade,47 all of it negative.
The criticism begins on the first page and continues until virtually the
last.48 She also refers in passing to Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,49 but her focus there is on an amicus brief submitted by a
group of historians rather than on the actual decision,50 and she de-
votes several pages to a very sympathetic profile of pro-life activist
Joseph Scheidler, who makes no bones about his goal of shutting
down abortion clinics and was sued by the National Organization for
Women in a case that went to the Supreme Court three times.51 Aston-
ishingly, however, there is no mention of Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 5 2 which reaffirmed that the Con-
stitution protects a right to abortion but repudiated much of the Roe
framework while announcing that abortion regulations would hence-
forth be assessed using a more deferential undue-burden test. Finally,
she criticizes President Clinton for vetoing legislation that would have
outlawed partial-birth abortion53 and takes heart that "Congress con-
tinues to attempt to ban" the procedure.5 4 In that connection, she ap-
parently has overlooked the passage of the Federal Partial-Birth Abor-
tion Ban Act of 2003;55 she also fails to note the Supreme Court's
pro-life to pro-choice. See HENDERSHOTT, supra note 2, at 15, 18-19, 21-22.
4' 410U.S. 113 (1973).
48 Professor Hendershott begins by saying that Roe "reveal[s] the will of
those with the power to shape the laws," HENDERSHOTT, supra note 2, at 1, and writes
near the end that "Roe has shown that laws imposed from the top down create chaos
and dissension," id. at 146.
49 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
" See HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at 6.
51 See generally id. at 67-76. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,
510 U.S. 249 (1994) (allowing the civil RICO suit to proceed because the statute does
not require that either the criminal enterprise nor the predicate acts have an economic
purpose); Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (holding that
the defendants' predicate acts did not involve the extortion of property from the plain-
tiffs and therefore could not support a civil RICO claim); Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for
Women, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1264 (2006) (holding that physical violence unrelated to
robbery or extortion, as alleged in claims apparently not addressed in the Supreme
Court's 2003 ruling, could not support a civil RICO claim).
52 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
53 HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at 18-19.
51 Id. at 138-39.
51 Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp.
IV 2004)). She does not mention this statute in her list of recent congressional initia-
tives, which includes the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
207, 116 Stat. 926 (codified at I U.S.C. § 8 (Supp. IV 2004)), and the Unborn Vic-
tims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (codified at 10
U.S.C. § 919a and 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (Supp. IV 2004)). HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2,
at 138.
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2000 ruling in Stenberg v. Carhart,56 which invalidated Nebraska's
partial-birth abortion law, or the several appellate rulings striking
down the federal law, two of which the Supreme Court will review
during its current term.
57
III.
In her introduction, Professor Hendershott laments that instead of
helping us understand the abortion debate, too many social scientists
have "enlisted in the pro-choice army.",58 She specifically criticizes
Professor Kristin Luker for using the term "embryo" instead of more
value-laden vocabulary (such as "fetus" or "baby") in her study of
activists on both sides of the abortion issue. Although Professor Luker
conceded that her terminology was "technically inaccurate," she de-
fended her decision as a way to avoid taking sides in connection with
her research. 59 Hendershott rejects this explanation, contending that
Luker had simply refused to "violate the tenets of feminist political
correctness. 6 ° Perhaps Luker's decision reflected a misguided gesture
toward objectivity, 6' but Hendershott does not contest any of Luker's
56 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
57 Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006); Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006) (No. 05-1382); Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir.
2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006) (No. 05-380). The Second and Ninth
Circuit rulings in National Abortion Federation and Planned Parenthood Federation
were decided on January 31, 2006, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Carhart on February 21, 2006. Even if these developments occurred too late for in-
clusion in the book, but see supra note 7 (noting citation of several more recent
sources), the Eighth Circuit's 2005 Carhart ruling came down well before several
other events that Professor Hendershott discusses. The Supreme Court accepted
Planned Parenthood Federation for review on June 19, 2006, which is later than any
source cited in the book.
58 HENDERSHOT, supra note 2, at 6.
59 KRISTIN LuKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 2 n *
(1984).
60 HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at 6.
61 Another writer on the abortion controversy decided that "[t]he least biased
solution [to the vocabulary problem] is to let each side choose its own name."
WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT: How CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION WAR
4 (2003). Luker sometimes, but not always, followed that approach in referring to the
activists' positions. See LUKER, supra note 59, at 2 n.*. Meanwhile, Professor Hend-
ershott dismisses Saletan's claim that pro-choice forces have lost control of the abor-
tion issue as "counterintuitive," HENDERSHOTr, supra note 2, at 5, but that does not
keep her from relying on Saletan's book in her discussion of President Clinton's
abortion policies. See id. at 155 nn. 1, 3-6, 11 & 20. She never explains what is "coun-
terintuitive" about Saletan's argument that pro-choice advocates have allowed abor-
tion opponents to set the terms of the debate even when abortion restrictions have
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findings or challenge her research methodology in any way. Like her
approach to so many other issues, Professor Hendershott's condemna-
tion of Professor Luker suggests an inability to understand or respect
positions with which she disagrees.62
It should be clear by now that Professor Hendershott strongly dis-
approves of abortion. This is consistent with her view that some
things are "morally wrong, 63 and her call on sociologists for "a re-
newed willingness to make moral judgments." 64 Readers might dis-
agree with her position, but there is nothing wrong with her having a
point of view. The problem arises because she allows her point of
view to get in the way of rigorous social scientific analysis. We sim-
ply cannot tell, from the evidence she presents, whether many of her
principal claims are accurate. Moreover, her approach raises serious
questions about the prospects for lowering the intensity of the abortion
debate. It is disheartening that a sociologist could not make a more
been rejected. Id. at 5.
62 Professor Luker's sensitivity to the opinions and motivations of activists
on both sides of the abortion debate stands in marked contrast to Professor Hender-
shott's approach. Another notable example of careful analysis of abortion activists of
all stripes, which Hendershott does not cite, is Faye Ginsburg's anthropological study
of Fargo, North Dakota, a city where frictions over abortion have resulted in numer-
ous reported judicial rulings. See generally FAYE D. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES:
THE ABORTION DEBATE IN AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1989). Among the many abor-
tion-related cases that have arisen in Fargo over the years are Veneklase v. City of
Fargo, 248 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (7-5 ruling upholding the validity of a
residential picketing ordinance); Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1996) (2-1
decision holding that a different version of the residential picketing ordinance vio-
lated the First Amendment); Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting a § 1983 claim brought by a pro-life demonstrator who violated a tempo-
rary restraining order against picketing an abortion clinic); United States v. Lindgren,
883 F. Supp. 1321 (D.N.D. 1995) (enjoining demonstrators from obstructing access to
an abortion clinic); State v. Holecek, 545 N.W.2d 800 (N.D. 1996) (reversing a trial
court's dismissal of criminal charges arising from demonstrations at the abortion
clinic); City of Fargo v. Brennan, 543 N.W.2d 240 (N.D. 1996) (affirming the convic-
tions of demonstrators at the clinic); Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Lambs of
Christ, 502 N.W.2d 536 (N.D. 1993) (upholding limits on demonstrations at the
clinic); State v. Franck, 499 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 1993) (affirming a conviction for
violating a preliminary injunction limiting demonstrations at the clinic); State v.
Purdy, 491 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1992) (affirming trespass convictions of protesters who
unlawfully entered the abortion clinic); Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. FM
Women's Help and Caring Connection, 444 N.W.2d 683 (N.D. 1989) (holding that
the abortion clinic could bring a false-advertising claim for damages against a pro-life
counseling service), overruled in part by Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. Duty Free Ameri-
cas, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 2001).
63 HENDERSHOIr, DEVIANCE, supra note 32, at 11.
64 Id. at 163; see also id. at 156 (criticizing "[t]he reluctance of sociologists
to acknowledge that there are moral judgments to be made").
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constructive contribution to public understanding of such a conten-
tious issue.
Of course, Professor Hendershott might not have set out to write a
broad overview of abortion politics. Perhaps she meant only to assess
the pro-life movement's current status and future prospects. That is
certainly consistent with the structure and tone of the volume she ac-
tually produced as well as with the one endorsement on the dust
jacket. Yet even from this perspective the book falls short. A good
lawyer must understand the other side's case as well as she knows her
own. So should a social scientist with a strong point of view. Because
of its gaps and blind spots, this book will not serve as a reliable guide
even for the most dedicated adherent to the pro-life cause.
65 That blurb, by Dr. Jennifer Roback Morse, concludes: "Pro-life leaders
and activists need this book."
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